The misinterpretation of similarities
In recent years, we've observed a notable shift within theological discourse, embodied in the emergence of "Reformed Thomism." This trend involves the attempted integration of Thomas Aquinas' teachings into the Reformed tradition, premised on the notion of retrieving Aquinas for the Protestant Reformed Churches. At its core, Reformed Thomism erroneously equates proximate similarities with ultimate similarities, risking a grave misrepresentation of the theological terrain.
The trouble with this lies in the over-emphasis of surface resemblances and their subsequent conflation with foundational commonalities. Such an approach neglects the fundamental contrasts in the theological, philosophical, and interpretive methodologies between the Reformed tradition and Aquinas's thought. It obscures our understanding of the essential distinctions and, if left unchecked, may lead to a softening of theological boundaries.
The concepts explored in this article are not limited to a single belief system. They are equally relevant to a broad array of belief structures with "Christian roots", such as contemporary cults. These groups often use similar language to express their doctrines, suggesting a surface-level similarity. However, these apparent similarities are vastly contrasted when seen in light of the profound differences that ultimately set them apart.
An essential distinction: Proximate and ultimate similarities
Cornelius Van Til offers invaluable wisdom regarding the differentiation between proximate and ultimate similarities—a crucial distinction that is often misunderstood or overlooked. He categorizes similarities into two levels. Proximate similarities are those apparent at first glance, such as superficially shared moral values, ecclesiastical practices, or even comparable views on select theological subjects.
In contrast, ultimate similarities dive far deeper, touching the foundational principles or core beliefs. These are the similarities that weave various doctrines or concepts together at a fundamental level, shaping the overall theological landscape.
Misunderstanding or conflating these two types of similarities can lead to doctrinal confusion and a dilution of theological distinctiveness, which in turn can open the church to age-old heresies that should be left dead in the grave.
The Nature-Grace dualism and the "donum superadditum"
Aquinas's philosophy is steeped in a distinct nature-grace dualism. Relying heavily on Aristotelian philosophy, he held that grace doesn't radically transform nature but rather perfects it. This stance positions human beings as capable of attaining a substantive understanding of the world through natural reason alone, with grace serving as a divine enhancement to this natural understanding.
... there is no reason why those things which may be learned from philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation...
... Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity.
Aquinas, ST, Part 1, Q1
Within this particular nature-grace framework, Aquinas saw Adam's nature as complete in itself. The "donum superadditum", or the superadded gift of original justice, was, in his view, an additional layer that bestowed an elevated level of perfection but didn't fundamentally alter Adam's nature. This perspective, though using similar terms and concepts (e.g. nature, grace, original righteousness), diverges significantly from the Reformed understanding and illustrates the risk of conflating proximate and ultimate similarities.
As a more concrete example, both Romanst and the Reformed traditions believe that the fall resulted in the loss of humanity's original righteousness. However, what the two schools mean by this are worlds apart.
The Reformed tradition maintains that the fall profoundly affected human nature, such that we became totally depraved and ethically corrupt, impacting our ability to accurately understand the world through natural reason alone.
None is righteous, no, not one; no one understands; no one seeks for God. All have turned aside; together they have become worthless; no one does good, not even one.
Their throat is an open grave; they use their tongues to deceive.
The venom of asps is under their lips.
Their mouth is full of curses and bitterness.
Their feet are swift to shed blood; in their paths are ruin and misery, and the way of peace they have not known.
There is no fear of God before their eyes.
Romans 3: 10 - 18, ESV
They are darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them, due to their hardness of heart.
Ephesians 4:18, ESV
In this context, special revelation becomes not a mere enhancement but a fundamental necessity, a corrective lens through which our distorted understanding is realigned with God's truth.
In Aquinas' view, the fall did not profoundly affect human nature, but it merely resulted in the loss of original righteousness (that is, the "donum superadditum"), but human nature remained largely unaffected. There is no darkened understanding or ethical rebellion. There are just humans who now lack "perfection".
The Reformed cannot follow this. In the Reformed tradition, the image of God in Adam is not an addendum to his nature. Rather, it is integral to his being. Adam's righteousness, true knowledge of God, and holiness weren't superadded features but essential characteristics of his created nature. This understanding radically transforms the nature-grace paradigm. Grace is not seen as an external addition to nature but as intrinsic to the created order (everything God created, He created good). Thus, grace doesn't merely enhance our natural understanding but is vital for our ability to truly comprehend the world and God.
Hence, while Aquinas and the Reformed tradition might employ similar language, their respective understandings of human nature, grace, and special revelation differ fundamentally. Recognizing these differences helps us to avoid erroneously elevating proximate similarities to ultimate similarities and maintain a clear distinction between the two theological perspectives.
Scripture: Not merely supplementary but fundamental
Aquinas' view of the fall means that he views Scripture as mere supplementation for the natural man - something that perfects the existing (fundamentally correct and justified) knowledge of sinners.
In ST 1, Part 1, Q1 Aquinas asks the question: "Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?" Usually, this question is used as proof that Aquinas does believe in the necessity of Special revelation, however, we need to appreciate the underlying system in which Aquinas makes his statements.
He writes,
It is written (2 Timothy 3:16): "All Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice." Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired of God...
Note his use of the word "useful", and not "necessary". He continues:
It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledgerevealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason...
...Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors...
Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation.