Recently, an article by Matt Marino on the "Reformed Classicalist" website discussed Kant's influence on Cornelius Van Til's apologetics, igniting considerable debate. Presuppositionalists quickly dismissed the piece as yet another misinterpretation of Van Til, while classicalists argued that presuppositionalism still confuses ontological and epistemological starting points (and is idealistic). This controversy has reignited calls for conferences and dialogues between the two camps.
Having not contributed to the debate between classical and presuppositional apologetics for some time, I see this as a valuable moment to revisit these objections. Perhaps a fresh examination will allow me to articulate the differences more effectively and, in the process, propose a path forward for both groups.
I will not delve into detailed introductions of Kant's or Van Til's philosophies, assuming that readers are already familiar with both figures and their respective ideologies to some extent.
The subject and the object
The core of the debate revolves around the relationship between the subject and the object. The subject is the individual or the mind attempting to comprehend reality, while the object is the entity being understood. For instance, if you aim to understand a "ball," you are the subject, and the ball is the object. The critical question is: How can you truly know what the "ball" is in itself? Does the ball imprint its essence onto your mind, or does your mind assign meaning to the ball for you to understand it?
Realism vs idealism
Realism is a philosophical stance where subjects (minds) are considered passive during the interpretation process. In this view, the objects of experience actively imprint their natures or meanings onto the subjects. Because the mind is passive, proper functioning cognitive functions should lead two different subjects to understand the object in the same way, assuming no perceptual or cognitive distortions. This philosophy posits that truth is objective and rooted in the properties of objects themselves.
Idealism is a philosophical approach where subjects (minds) play an active role in the interpretation process, as opposed to being passive. In this view, objects are shaped to fit the categories of the mind. Greg Bahnsen likened this process to how water is formed into ice cubes: the objects, like water, are initially chaotic and formless. When they are placed into containers and frozen, they adopt a structured form. Similarly, the mind acts as a container, molding the objects of experience to conform to its mental categories. Consequently, under idealism, truth becomes subjective; it is no longer anchored in the external reality of objects, but rather in the individual's mental perceptions.
Kant
Kant’s philosophy marked a significant departure from the prevailing "realism" of his time, which posited that minds should conform to experience. Kant introduced what he described as a philosophical "Copernican revolution." Drawing an analogy to Copernicus, who centuries earlier had shifted the perceived center of the solar system from the Earth to the Sun, Kant proposed that the subject (mind) should be seen as the center of knowledge, rather than the objects of perception.
Kant differentiated between the noumenal and the phenomenal realms. The noumenal represents things as they are in themselves, independent of our perception (essentially, what objects are "in and of themselves".) The phenomenal, on the other hand, refers to how these things appear to us once they have been processed or interpreted by our minds.
Marino writes that [square brackets my own]:
What Kant put in the place of the older [that is, realist] outlook was a two-tiered framework, in which the metaphysical “way things are” was placed above the line.
This he called the noumenal. Most people tend to focus on the objects of this “upper tier” as being God, logic, love, justice, freedom, the self, and what he called “the thing in itself” (ding an sich). The significance of this last object is usually what is missed. It is not simply that “things up there,” that is, spiritual or invisible things, are inaccessible to reason. It is the essence of anything and everything that is inaccessible. In other words, it is precisely “the way things are,” outside of our minds in some common field, which was the old pipe dream of metaphysics.
Now below the line Kant placed the appearance of things to each of us. This he called the phenomenal. Again, those who miss the first point will miss the significance here as well. Superficial treatments of Kant take this lower tier to be the visible world studied by science. Indeed it is. However, that is precisely a post-metaphysical surface of those phenomena. If one is consistent, each set of data must be reduced to how it appears to me or to you.
Kant and Van Til (Marino), [Square brackets my own].
According to Kant, the objects of experience do not inherently contain any order for the mind to discover; rather, the mind actively imposes its own structure on these objects.
This concept has significant implications for Christian theology:
For instance, if we interpret the Westminster Confession of Faith (which describes God as "infinite and incomprehensible") through a Kantian lens, we arrive at a troubling conclusion: God, being beyond our sensory experience and thus residing in the noumenal realm, is essentially unknowable. According to Kantian philosophy, the God described in our confessions transcends what we can comprehend or experience. Therefore, any human attempt to describe God is inherently limited, subjective, and ultimately fails to make contact with who God really is.
In response to the challenge of knowing and understanding God, theologians often emphasize the concept of divine revelation. They argue that although God may not be directly accessible as an object of knowledge, humans can still know Him because He has revealed Himself in nature and Scripture.
However, this claim is not enough to escape the Kantian critique. According to Kant, any revelation from God would necessarily be processed through human understanding and perception (like any other object of perception). This means that the revelation would also be confined by the inherent limitations and categorizations of the human mind. As a result, our understanding of such revelations would not be a direct apprehension of God as He is in Himself, but rather a constructed (and thus subjective) understanding shaped by our cognitive faculties.
If idealism holds true, it leads to skepticism about our ability to truly know God. Given this implication, it is commendable that Marino and our classical counterparts strive to purge Kantian influences from Christian philosophy. Indeed, eliminating such influences is essential if we are to secure objective knowledge of God (or of any subject, for that matter). If Kant's ideas have unduly influenced us, Marino's efforts to help us divest ourselves of this philosophical legacy are indeed valuable.
Marino argues that Van Til, and by extension his followers, have been influenced by Kant. Let us now examine Marino's reasons for this concern.
Van Til
Van Til entered the philosophical fray in the 1920s, earning accolades for "reforming" the realm of apologetics, which had been predominantly guided by classical methodologies. Van Til challenged the classical approach of proving God's existence from subordinate facts, asserting instead that the existence of God is the fundamental fact necessary for reasoning and predicating at all.
Classicalists, however, remain unconvinced by Van Til's approach. They argue that his assertion (that the existence of God is foundational for all reasoning and predication) is not as "revolutionary" as it might appear. Marino writes (emphasis my own):
Now first we must see that the classicalist will wholly agree that we ought to discern that God’s existence is a necessary condition for human knowledge in exactly the way Van Til says...
Marino and others acknowledge that Van Til was addressing more than just ontological issues. He was also making an epistemological argument. Specifically, Van Til posited that God is the "precondition of intelligibility" for all knowledge and understanding.
However, Marino contends that Van Til’s epistemological claim is flawed and exhibits traces of Kantian influence. He argues that it is indeed possible to know and accomplish things without acknowledging God as the "precondition of intelligibility". Therefore, in Marino’s view, Van Til and modern presuppositionalists confuse ontology with epistemology.
The heart of the critique against Van Til
Marino's critique essentially labels Van Til's approach as fideistic, emphasizing a deep reliance on faith over empirical or rational evidence. Marino discusses the "Kantian bridge into Van Tillianism," highlighting Van Til's insistence on starting from a presupposed theological basis "frankly starting from above."
Classicalists maintain that despite Van Til's criticisms of Kant, his method still relies on the Kantian idea that knowledge is not just about empirical observation (that is, realistic) but also about the interpretive frameworks we bring to our experiences (which is idealistic). It is claimed that Van Til's assertion that "without the presupposition of God all reasoning and factual understanding would be meaningless" aligns with Kant's notion that our perception and understanding of the world are significantly shaped by the mental structures we bring to bear on our experiences, thus making the knowledge of reality dependent on these structures.
Thus, Marino interprets Van Til's method as Kantian and fideistic, where Christian doctrine becomes a lens (even if an indispensable lens) through which all knowledge is interpreted, signalling a shift from objective understanding to a knowledge system rooted in theological presuppositions. This, Marino argues, demonstrates a significant departure from a realist epistemology to one that prioritizes faith-based assumptions.
The same kind of critique can also be heard in a recent interview featuring James Dolezal and Matthew Barret. Dolezal states that some Reformed Protestants have adopted a form of idealism. He continues by saying that this idealist perspective contends that humans, in their natural capacity, cannot truly understand nature as it is. Consequently, they require an extraordinary, supernatural illumination (beyond mere rationality and the natural intelligibility of the world) to truly perceive and comprehend nature.
Dolezal then proceeds to equate this idealistic perspective with Karl Barth and Van Til and claims that both men argued for a "revelational epistemology" (I was quite discouraged by Dolezal equating Van Til and Barth in this way) in the sense that they assume, similar to idealists, that humans inherently lack direct access to nature and thus require additional principles or concepts to clarify and make nature comprehensible. This is the view espoused by Kant who argued that the human mind structures our understanding of nature through its inherent faculties.
Marino and Dolezal, over and against this "idealism" and "Kantian influences", argue for the intellectual "realist" tradition of medieval philosophy which according to them provides adequate resources to address and counter the modernist challenges introduced by Kant by postulating that man has direct access to nature. I.e., there is no extraordinary illumination or thought structures required in order to see the facts for what they are.
In short, the charge levied against Van Til and his followers is that they are implicit idealists.
Initial responses to Marino's critique
Supporters of Van Til's philosophy quickly defended it against Marino's criticisms. They argued that Van Til merely maintained the necessity of God's existence as a precondition for the truth. However, this defence frustrated classical apologists because it failed to highlight how Van Til's approach differed from traditional classical apologetics. Surely Van Til wasn't merely making an ontological argument?
The frustration among Van Til's followers was also heightened as they found themselves repeatedly clarifying (once again) that Van Til did not claim unbelievers are incapable of knowing anything. However, classical apologists argue that if unbelievers are indeed capable of knowledge, this seems to align more with classical apologetics, specifically realism. If Van Til acknowledged that unbelievers could know things without acknowledging God, then his position seems to retreat significantly, suggesting that one can know much without understanding the underlying conditions for that knowledge - a point also discussed in Marino's article. This leaves the question: how does Van Til's system distinctively differ from the classical approach?
Misunderstandings persist, and observing the recent exchanges has highlighted the frustration felt by both sides once again. This situation leads me to wonder why there can't be more charity between the two camps. If classical apologists are quick to label Van Til as an idealist and meet resistance from Van Tillians, perhaps this should prompt them to delve deeper into Van Til's philosophy rather than dismissing it as contradictory. Similarly, Van Tillians should seriously engage with the concerns raised by classical apologists rather than dismiss them as ignorant. By doing so, both sides can advance this crucial dialogue together.
In the spirit of fostering mutual understanding and having taken the time to appreciate Marino's perspective, I am now prepared to respond from a Van Tillian viewpoint to his concerns about Van Til being perceived as a Kantian idealist and a fideist. This response will also aim to elucidate the Van Tillian assertion that God is the necessary precondition for intelligible experience.
A Van Tillian response
Van Til encourages us to shift our philosophical starting point:
Rather than beginning with the debate between realism and idealism (what Lane Tipton describes as the "horizontal relationship" between subjects and objects), we should consider the "vertical" relationship involving subjects, objects, and God their Creator.
This fundamental shift underpins Van Til’s approach as introduced in the opening sections of his Survey of Christian Philosophy. Here, Van Til sets his perspective apart from both classicalists (realism as traditionally understood) and Kantians (idealism as traditionally understood). He does not align strictly with either camp (although he does express a preference for the realist philosophies of ancient thinkers over modern ones, praising their pursuit of objective truth).
Nonetheless, Van Til argues that before exploring the relationships between subjects and objects, we must first consider their relationships with God. This, he asserts, is the more foundational inquiry.
Van Til writes that [square brackets my own]
The core of our system of philosophy is our belief in the triune God of Scripture, and in what he has revealed concerning himself and his purposes for man and his world...
According to Scripture, God has created the “universe.” God has created time and space. God has created all the “facts” of science [i.e., God has created all objects]
God has created the human mind. In this human mind God has laid the laws of thought according to which it is to operate [i.e., God has created all subjects].
In the facts of science God has laid the laws of being according to which they function.
In other words, the impress of God’s plan is upon his whole creation. We may characterize this whole situation by saying that the creation of God is a revelation of God. God revealed himself in nature and God also revealed himself in the mind of man.
Thus it is impossible for the mind of man to function except in an atmosphere of revelation. And every thought of man when it functioned normally in this atmosphere of revelation would express the truth as laid in the creation by God.
We may therefore call a Christian epistemology a revelational epistemology.
Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, [square brackets my own]
Van Til continues,
How can the human mind know anything about any of the facts of the universe [objects] if these facts as well as the mind itself [subjects] are not related upon the basis of a more fundamental unity in the plan of God?
Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology
Van Til posits that the unity of the subject-object relationship is not centred on human cognition. Instead (and this cannot be stressed enough), he emphasizes that the fundamental principle of their unity is the plan of God. This encompasses the decree of God, alongside His acts of creation and providence (see Lane Tipton's lecture on Van Til's critique of Kant for more).
Thus, we can say that there is an organic connection between objects and subjects, and this organic connection forms part of the "atmosphere" of revelation in which we operate.
In saying this, Van Til has distinguished himself completely from Kant. Any claim that Van Til is Kantian in his approach cannot hold water:
[It] is exactly Kant’s contention that the human mind does have a sphere of knowledge of its own apart from its relation to God and apart from the relation of the facts to God.
And this position would not be tenable unless the mind of man were independent of the divine mind in some essential respect.
In reality it matters not whether one says that man knows one fact or a thousand facts or all facts apart from God. In all cases he is equally antitheistic.
Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology
The doctrine of creation establishes a world that is external and created, ensuring that subjects and objects are interrelated in a way that facilitates objective knowledge of what God has planned, created, and revealed. Contra Kant (and more akin to realistic philosophies), the human mind (subject) encounters intrinsically intelligible objects, being both created by God and revelatory of Him.
Consequently, the intelligibility of experience is not a construct of the human mind. Rather, the mind is designed to apprehend the intelligibility of experiences as defined and interpreted by God.
So, against Kant, Van Til denies that objects must conform to the constructive understanding of man. In this sense, Van Til cannot be labelled as Kantian or idealistic, and Marino can rest assured that Van Til has successfully avoided any unduly influence from Kant. Van Til contends that we start our philosophical inquiry with the being, knowledge, revelation, and work of the Triune God. God endows all subjects and objects with intrinsic intelligibility and reveals Himself through all created objects and even within the human mind. It is God, not the constructive capacities of human understanding, who confers intelligibility on objects. His revelation permeates all of creation.
God as the precondition for knowledge
With the background provided, we can now better understand what Van Til meant when he described God as the "precondition" for knowledge. Importantly, God being the precondition for knowledge does not mean it is a set of principles guiding how the human mind should ideally interpret facts in the Kantian sense. Instead, Van Til's assertion points to a foundational aspect of reality that transcends mere idealistic interpretations.
The doctrine of creation is pivotal in understanding how God serves as the precondition for all knowledge. This foundational principle explains how non-Christians can possess knowledge even without consciously "believing in God." Contrary to what would be expected if Van Til were a Kantian (that unbelievers cannot know anything) the reality is more nuanced. Unbelievers, despite suppressing the knowledge of God due to unrighteousness, continue to exist in a world rich with divine revelation. This world, structured by God's creative act, upholds the inherent relationships between subjects and objects that allow for knowledge to occur.
Therefore, Marino’s statement that "Van Til is actually saying more than that God must exist in order for our reason to operate here. He is saying that one must know that God exists in order for our reason to operate here" is not entirely accurate. Van Til posits that the framework for rational thought and the acquisition of knowledge is already divinely established, regardless of an individual's conscious acknowledgement of God’s existence.
For example, my baby daughter is not capable of articulating belief in God or grasping the "metaphysical insight" that God's existence is necessary for knowledge. However, she doesn't need to consciously understand this. She is already immersed in God's revelatory environment. Without knowing or articulating it, she functions as a creation within God's world, engaging with objects that God has imbued with intrinsic meaning.
This entire scenario can be aptly described as "theistic realism," where the relationship between subjects and objects is maintained within a framework established by God, independent of human cognitive awareness of this divine orchestration. It is precisely for this reason that we can read and understand Scripture before fully comprehending Scripture itself.
In contrast, for the idealist, Scripture would be unable to convey knowledge that extends beyond the mental constructs already present in the subject's mind. If Van Til were an idealist, he might have argued that we inherently possess all the crucial epistemological components of Scripture needed to shape our epistemology before reading Scripture, suggesting that our understanding of divine truth is already embedded within our mental constructs.
Thus, God being the "precondition" for knowledge is an ontological claim with epistemological consequences. Far from conflating epistemology with ontology, Van Til saw that both disciplines can be distinguished, but that our beliefs about ontology will surely influence what we can say about epistemology.
It is at this juncture that we get to Van Til's presuppositional apologetic.
When Van Til discusses his apologetic approach as 'transcendental,' he is deliberately repurposing Kant’s terminology to contrast sharply with Kant's philosophical framework.
This is what Van Til means by his transcendental method:
[We] must seek to determine what presuppositions are necessary to any object of knowledge in order that it may be intelligible to us.
It is not as though we already know some facts and laws to begin with, irrespective of the existence of God, in order then to reason from such a beginning to further conclusions.
It is certainly true that if God has any significance for any object of knowledge at all, the relation of God to that object of knowledge must be taken into consideration from the outset. It is this fact that the transcendental method seeks to recognize.
Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology
Thus, while unbelievers are capable of knowing things, they do so despite their non-Christian philosophies, not because of them. This is a crucial point often overlooked by Van Til's critics: unbelievers can acquire knowledge, but this is only practical because they exist within God's revelational atmosphere. Thus, unbelievers can do science, math, politics and a plethora of other things alongside Christians. And where we find truth revealed in these non-believers, we must accept it for what it is, as all truth is God's truth.
However, in principle, if one were to fully accept what unbelievers claim about their beliefs regarding themselves, God, and the world (that they do not live in an atmosphere of divine revelation) then, according to their own assertions, they would not be able to know anything.
It is unnatural for humans to reject their Creator and attempt to function autonomously, claiming that facts can be known independently of God’s revelational atmosphere. Humans were created in the image of God, endowed with an inherent religious fellowship and knowledge of Him. We are given the mandate to interpret, discover, and manage creation in covenantal obedience, fully acknowledging that this is His world. Van Til encourages us to press the antithesis when humans rebel against this natural knowledge of God by feigning ignorance of God's existence or when going so far as to claim his non-existence.
By feigning ignorance or denying God's existence, unbelievers are establishing a specific ontological framework, one that has profound epistemological ramifications. It is precisely here that God must be demonstrated as a precondition for knowledge. That is, if you do not presuppose the existence of God (as God is the precondition for intelligibility) then, in principle, you cannot know anything at all (an epistemological assertion). However, the very fact that you do possess knowledge contradicts and undermines your claim of ignorance regarding God’s existence.
Van Til writes
Belief in God is the most human attitude conceivable. It is abnormal not to believe in God. We must therefore hold that only the Christian theist has real objectivity, while the others are introducing false prejudices, or subjectivity.
Survey of Christian Epistemology
Van Til contends that the very act of reasoning abnormally, as if God does not exist and as if humans are not His creations, ironically gives rise to philosophical dilemmas such as idealism, which fosters subjectivity. Instead of attempting to prove God's existence from non-Christian starting points, we adopt a transcendental approach. We argue that unless the God of the Bible exists and the system of knowledge presented in the Bible is accurate, it is impossible to know any fact at all truly.
Van Til discussed the concepts of proximate and ultimate starting points to elucidate how knowledge is approached differently depending on one's foundational beliefs. Proximately, both Christians and non-Christians begin their process of knowing in a similar manner, engaging with the world through the same empirical and rational means. To elaborate, here's an extensive quote from Van Til's Survey of Christian Epistemology, which captures the essence of our discussion:
Summing up our discussion of the matter of the object of knowledge as far as the starting point is concerned, we enumerate the following points of importance:
A. We may start our process of acquiring knowledge and of discussing whether we have true knowledge with any “fact.” But this is only the immediate or proximate starting point. The real difficulty begins with the question of an ultimate starting point.
1. Here the question is as to what we mean by the existence or denotation of any “fact.” It will not do to take for granted that the term existence can intelligibly be applied to any “fact” if that “fact” is thought of as separated from God. That is just the one point at issue.
2. In the second place, the question of connotation must come up here. Again, it will not do to take for granted that the connotation of a “fact” can be established apart from any reference to God. The whole contention of the Christian theistic position is that what is called the subject-object relation, that is, the possibility of my having knowledge of any object whatsoever, is unintelligible except upon the presupposition that every subject of knowledge, since subjects are from this point of view also objects, owes its existence and its connotation, in the last analysis, to God. Hence it will not do for antitheists to begin their whole process of reasoning upon the assumption of the falsity of the theistic position. The very contention of theism is that a fact, to be known truly, must be known as a theistic fact. Hence it is manifestly illogical and unfair for the opponents of this position to begin by assuming that facts can be known as antitheistic facts.
B. A similar argument holds with respect to the relation of Scripture to true knowledge. Christian theism holds that without the light of Scripture no fact can be known truly. Hence it will not do for our opponents to throw out this contention at the outset as something which is not a “live option” to an educated person. The argument for the necessity of Scripture, we have seen, is theistic in the sense that a true theism stands or falls with the position given to Scripture.
C. The second main question considered was the object-object relation. It is the question of nature and history. The contention of Christian theism is that there must be laws in nature and in history, but that these laws have no meaning except upon the presupposition of God that furnishes the binding cement for all the facts of spatialtemporal experience. Accordingly, it will not do for our opponents to assume that nature and history exist and operate independently of God.
Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology
Close
I hope this article has added value to the ongoing discussion. I have endeavoured to demonstrate that Van Til should not be labelled a Kantian or an idealist. Furthermore, I have tried to show that Van Til did not conflate epistemology and ontology.
The prior article would hopefully be enough to dispel any charges that Van Til was an idealist. However, what still needs to be done is to show how Van Til's "theistic realism" is superior to the "realism" of the medieval theologians. This we will leave for a later date.
Discussion
Engage in theological discourse.